The basic difference between reform and revolution is that reform deals with limited changes. As Blumer (1995) stated, “A revolutionary movement has a broader aim [than reform], it seeks to reconstruct the entire society; reform movement accepts the existing orders, but revolutionary movement always challenges the existing rules” (p. 74).
According to Huntington (1968), “changes limited in scope and moderate in speed in leadership, policy, and political institutions may, in turn, be classed as reforms” (p. 344). Huntington examined reforms from two dimensions, and concluded that a reform could be either a catalyst or a substitute for a revolution. He explained that once a reform led to concessions and grants by a government, it could encourage the people to push for a revolution within the society (Huntington, 1968). The French Revolution provides a salient example. Huntington (1968) rightly cites from Tocqueville (1866) “Reforms in France prepared the ground for the revolution not so much because they removed obstacles in its way but far more because they taught the nation how to set about it” (p. 363). On the other hand, if governmental reforms make changes that satisfy reformists demands, leaders can decrease the likelihood that a revolution will take place (Huntington, 1968).
Huntington (1968) claimed that urban middle-class intelligentsia and the peasantry were key actors in a reform effort, and noted that urban middle-class intelligentsia are more likely to drive a reform toward a revolution. A reform can be a catalyst for a revolution once urban middle-class intelligentsia pioneer it not rural parts of society.
In the case of the Arab uprisings, the resistances in Morocco, Algeria, and Yemen could fall under the category of reformative social movements, because uprisings in these states brought only limited and superficial changes within the oppressive regimes. At present, the despotic systems still exist with only limited and surface-level changes.
A true revolution involved substantive and systemic change. The following discussion of this concept will draw from the work of two prominent scholars in this field: Theda Skocpol and Samuel P. Huntington. According to Skocpol (1979), “Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below” (p. 4). It is extremely important to note that social revolution is different from political revolutions. While political revolutions only bring about change to political structures, social revolutions lead to changes in all structures of society (Skocpol, 1979, pp. 4-5).
Skocpol (1979) employed a non-voluntarist, structural perspective when defining social revolution, and grounded her categorization in the comparative analysis of three great revolutions: France, China, and Russia. However, she neglected to consider the impact of ideology in a revolution, and in this sense she quoted Wendell Phillip’s statement, “Revolutions are not made; they come” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17). After the Iranian revolution of 1979, Skocpol (1982) augmented her definition to include the notion of ideology. She later stated, “Revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a country’s state and class structures, and of its dominant ideology” (Skocpol, 1982, p. 265). The dominant ideology obviously was Shi’a Islam.
Huntington (1968) also made a very important contribution to the study of revolution. According to Huntington, “A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies” (p. 264). Unlike Skocpol, Huntington undervalued the impact of international geopolitics and instead emphasized the values and norms of a society for a revolution. In stark contrast to Skocpol’s claims, Huntington argued that revolutions are made (pp. 274-275). More importantly, whereas Skocpol only counted the relationships between the dominant class and the government in her study of revolution, Huntington also considered other parts of society. As Huntington (1968) stated, “One social group can be responsible for a coup, a riot, or a revolt, but only a combination of groups can produce a revolution” (p. 277).
In a different approach, Parsa (2000) explained revolution based upon the type of state intervention. Parsa identified three primary types of state interventions: regulative, administrative, and hyperactive. Regulative state interventions involve minimal involvement in the collection and distribution of economic matters, while administrative state moderately but hyperactive state mediations entail extensive involvement, respectively (Parsa, 2000). During crises, “states that intervene to a great extent in the economy render themselves more vulnerable to challenge and attack” (Parsa, 2000, p. 14). By contrast, a lower level of state intervention increases the likelihood of class conflict, but reduces the probability of revolution (Parsa, 2000). The Shah’s hyperactive governmental model in Iran is a great example of how a state grew vulnerable and, ultimately, became the direct target of revolts.
Parsa (2000) also emphasized the impact of military force during a revolution. Professional armies become less susceptible to revolution while conscripts become more vulnerable. The latter group has a deeper relationship with members of the society, which increases the likelihood that they will sympathize with the demands of the revolutionaries (Parsa, 2000). Russell (1974) measured the army’s impact on revolution using three components: “the degree of disloyalty (D), the timing of disloyalty (T), and the proportion of the armed forces which were disloyal (P)” (p. 74). A incidences of all three factors (D*T*P) increase the chances that a revolution will take place (Russell, 1974).
Considering these explanations, the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia fall into the category of political revolutions, because the political structures of the hyperactive states changed through pro-democratic revolutionary social movements. After the revolutions, one can see the change in the location of political sovereignty in these states from undemocratically elected rulers to (relatively) democratically elected rulers. These uprisings did not result in social revolution because revolutionary changes within the economic and social structures have yet to occur.
Repressive, corrupt, and unjust rulers played an important role in the revolutions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia because the long-term cruelty and pressure created a culture of resistance within the populace. The democratization of communication and the establishment of a greater connection with the rest of the world intensified the sentiment.
Types of Revolutions
Huntington (1968) placed revolutions into two basic categories—Eastern and Western—based on the type of society in which the revolution took place. There are several key differences between the two categories. The Eastern revolution appears before the collapse of the old regime, while the Western revolution occurs after the breakdown of the old regime (Huntington, 1968). In addition, the Eastern revolution spreads from countryside to capital, while the Western revolution spreads vice versa (Huntington, 1968). Lastly, the struggle in the Eastern revolutions happens between revolutionaries and government, while in the West, the fight occurs between revolutionaries, such as moderate, conservative, and radical insurgents (Huntington, 1968).
Moore (1967) conceptualized revolutions by their source: peasants, bourgeoisie, or top-class. He emphasized the importance of the bourgeoisie’s involvement if a revolution was to lead to a Western-type democracy. Moore classified the French and American Revolutions as bourgeois, as both led to a democratic society. For the sake of simplicity, Moore argued that there were, “bourgeois revolutions culminating in the Western form of democracy, conservative revolutions from above ending in fascism, and peasant revolutions leading to communism” (p. 413). In a contradiction of Marxist argument, Moore summed up his argument in four words, “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” (p. 418). Even though Skocpol (1994) agreed that by stating, “rising bourgeoisie is the prime power,” she criticized Moore’s approach. According to Skocpol, Moore undervalued state organizations and the elite’s independent role in a revolution, and believed that Moore’s approach “focus[ed] on exclusively intrasocietal modernizing processes” (p. 45).
The pro-democratic political revolutions in the Arab uprisings could fall into the category of Eastern revolutions because the revolts occurred before the governments had collapsed, yet it is not easy to make a clear-cut categorization. An ongoing fight still rages between conservatives, moderates, and liberals in the post-revolutionary states, which makes them relatively Western revolutions. The revolutions also spread from the capital and big cities to the countryside, like Western revolutions.
During this examination of the varied definitions of revolution, it is important to ask what a revolution is not. Huntington (1968) offers a comprehensive categorization that distinguishes between revolution and other types of social action.
“Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence. A coup d’état in itself changes only leadership and perhaps policies; a rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and political institutions, but not social structure and values; a war of independence is a struggle of one community against rule by an alien community and does not necessarily involve changes in the social structure of either community (p. 264)”.
As stated previously, a revolution is a radical and profound change of system. The revolutionary change might serve to pave the way towards democracy, or it may lead to the destruction of all viable paths towards a democratic system.
Notes
Blumer, H. (1995). Social movements. In S. M. Lyman (Ed.), Social movements: Critiques, concepts, case-studies (pp. 60-83). New York, NY: New York University.
Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT & London, England: Yale University.
Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma.
Moore Jr., B. (1967). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. London, England: Allen Lane.
Parsa, M. (2000). States, ideologies, and social revolutions : A comparative analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. Port Chester, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Russell, D. E. H. (1974). Rebellion, revolution, and armed force: A comparative study of fifteen countries with special emphasis on Cuba and South Africa. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Skocpol, T. (1979). States and social revolutions : A comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge, England and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Skocpol, T. (1982). Rentier state and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian revolution. Theory and Society, 11(3), 265-283.
Skocpol, T. (1994 ). Social revolutions in the modern world (Vol. Cambridge studies in comparative politics). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
